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Abstract 
 
 This paper characterises the impact of vertical integration on price equilibria and incentives to 
strategically withhold capacity in a wholesale electricity auction.  A two-stage game is analysed where 
vertically integrated firms first declare the quantity of electricity available and then compete in a uniform 
price auction.  Consistent with empirical literature on electricity markets, the model finds that firms’ 
incentives are determined by their net demand position in the market.  Results indicate that for the 
majority of parameter values, a vertically integrated structure yields a greater occurrence of competitive 
pricing in the wholesale market.  Contrary to recent analysis of non-integration, vertical integration 
eliminates incentives for strategic capacity withholding. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past twenty years, electricity markets throughout the world have 
undergone reform.  Countries have moved from industries dominated by one or two 
vertically integrated government entities, to more market-based structures in which 
competition takes place in stages of production where competition is perceived possible.  
The primary aims of the reforms were to increase competition, efficiency, and private 
participation in the electricity sector.  
Many reformed markets share common features such as a separate transmission 
company providing non-discriminatory access, competing generation companies, a spot 
market for electricity, competing retail companies, and an independent regulator.  This 
model has been applied in the UK, Australia, the USA, Sweden, Norway, and New 
Zealand, among others (Baldwin, 2004). 
Despite the common characteristics, countries have diverged on a number of 
features, one of which is the vertical structure of the industry.  An electricity supply 
industry consists of four vertically related stages: generation, transmission, distribution, 
and retail.  The California and UK reforms imposed vertical separation between 
generation and retail activities in the belief that doing so would create incentives for 
further entry into the industry, while Spain and New Zealand have permitted some 
degree of integration.  As Kuhn and Machado (2004) discuss, it was not clear at the 
time of the reforms how vertical integration would affect the exercise of market power 
in the electricity spot market.  Below is a table of current vertically integrated and non-
vertically integrated markets. 
 
 
Vertically Integrated Not Vertically Integrated  
Denmark 
England1 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
New Zealand 
Norway 
PJM2 
Spain 
Sweden
Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
California 
Chile 
Texas 
 
Table 1: Vertically integrated and non-vertically integrated markets as of October 2004 
 
Of the markets that do permit integration, they do so to varying degrees.  The 
New Zealand and PJM markets allow ownership of both retail and generation assets, but 
place constraints on the ownership of transmission and distribution companies (Mansur 
2003).  Spain permits vertical integration by generators into both retail and distribution 
                                                 
1 While the 1990 reforms mandated vertical separation, since 1998, the England and Wales regulator has 
begun to permit some cross ownership of retail and generation facilities (Green, 2004). 
2 Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland 
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(Kuhn and Machado, 2004).  Germany has firms that are strongly vertically integrated 
between generation and transmission, and which also own a significant part of the 
distribution networks and retail activities (Brunekreeft, 2002).  
Firms that can vertically integrate opt to do so to provide themselves with a 
natural hedge against moving wholesale (spot) prices.  Consumers are not exposed to 
wholesale prices, which results in a lack of almost any wholesale price elasticity of 
demand.  Furthermore, one of the primary services of retailers is price stability, 
allowing consumers to know how much their electricity costs.  For this reason 
wholesale prices are far more volatile than retail prices.  High wholesale prices benefit 
generators, while low wholesale prices benefit retailers, and vertically integrating 
internalises hedging, as opposed participating in a hedge market. 
Since the reforms, the subsequent performance of a number of markets has been 
disappointing.  One common problem is the exercise of market power by generators.  
As Kühn and Machado (2004) discuss, the lack of almost any wholesale price elasticity 
of demand leads to strong incentives for generators to raise prices.   
A number of markets, including New Zealand, Chile, Brazil, and California, 
have experienced recent supply shortages which have highlighted shortcomings in 
market design.  The California 2000-01 crisis was aggravated by the retail price freeze, 
and the mandate that utilities buy all their energy on the Price Exchange.  Brazil’s 2001 
shortage was exacerbated by lack of incentives for investment in generation and 
transmission.  Chile’s 1998-89 blackouts were blamed on the rigid price system, and the 
poor performance of the regulator (Watts and Ariztía, 2002).  New Zealand’s 2001 
supply problems were exacerbated by inadequate use of the hedge market, and 
inadequate retail competition (Hodgson, 2002).   
The problems with reformed markets have raised questions regarding optimal 
market structure, in particular with respect to vertical integration.  While every 
electricity market has its own idiosyncrasies in terms of design, vertically integrated 
markets appear to have incurred less supply shortages than vertically integrated markets.  
Of the recent crises detailed above, only New Zealand operates with a vertically 
integrated industry.  This raises the question whether a vertically integrated market for 
electricity, in which generators also participate in the retail sector, operates better than a 
non-vertically integrated structure. 
The disappointing performance of reformed electricity markets has inspired 
empirical work, analysing the level of competitiveness in vertically integrated and non-
vertically integrated electricity industries.  Kühn and Machado (2004) analyse the 
vertically integrated Spanish electricity market and find that the way market power is 
exercised depends on whether each firm is a net demander or supplier into the wholesale 
market at a particular point in time.  Net suppliers attempt to raise the price received for 
the net electricity sold, while net demanders try to reduce the price paid for the net units 
purchased in the spot market.  Kühn and Machado (2004) conclude that it may not be a 
good idea to enforce vertical disintegration in liberalized electricity markets.  Mansur 
(2003) analyses the vertically integrated Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland (PJM) 
market, and finds relatively competitive behaviour, stemming from the fact that vertical 
integration of firms reduces generators’ interest in setting high prices.  Only firms with 
large net selling positions in the wholesale market reduced output relative to 
competitive production estimates.  Mansur (2003) finds that the two large net-sellers in 
the market produced 14% less than they would have in a competitive environment. 
Wolak and Patrick (1997) analyse withholding capacity as a means of raising prices 
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without bidding above marginal cost.  They find that generators in the England and 
Wales market declared roughly the same amount of capacity available relative to 
demand, and because demand was much lower in off-peak months, this meant a large 
amount of capacity was not made available to the market during those periods.  
However, Green (2004) finds that capacity availability figures do not provide 
conclusive evidence of capacity withholding with the purpose of raising prices.  He 
does find, however, that in the England and Wales market, an outage will sometimes be 
prolonged longer than necessary with the intention of keeping capacity payments high. 
Recent empirical literature on capacity withholding in electricity markets has 
given rise to discussion on the optimal framework with which to model electricity 
markets.  Two common approaches are to either assume price competition3, or Cournot 
(quantity) competition4.  Green (2004) finds that Cournot models of electricity auctions 
do possess attractive features.  They can support detailed modelling of costs, and don’t 
have the problem of multiple equilibria results.  However, they do not give a good 
representation of the way in which prices are set in electricity markets, and their price 
predictions have generally been too high.  He argues that models in which firms set 
prices, rather than quantities, are likely to provide better results.  Crampes and Creti 
(2003) model electricity auctions using a variation to the game developed by Kreps and 
Scheinkman (1983).  A short-run model is constructed that takes installed capacities as 
given.  Firms compete in a two-stage game where they first simultaneously choose 
declared capacities, and then after observing each other’s declared capacity, the firms 
simultaneously choose prices.5  This framework endogenises capacity choice, which 
permits analysis of strategic capacity withholding, a feature which simple price-setting 
models lack.  They find that the uniform auction procedure in a non-vertically integrated 
industry provides strong incentives for strategic capacity withholding.  Spear (2003) 
models an electricity market in a general equilibrium setting and finds that limited 
competition among generators leads to prices that exceed marginal cost during of peak 
periods, as well as a clear incentive for producers to reduce capacity whenever possible.   
One common feature of the theoretical models by Fabra, von der Fehr, and 
Harbord (2004), Spear (2003), Joskow and Tirole (2004), and Crampes and Creti (2003) 
is that they model non-vertically integrated electricity markets.  No model has analysed 
short-term pricing behaviour and incentives for capacity withholding in a vertically 
integrated electricity industry, as is the case for so many markets, including PJM, New 
Zealand, Spain, and Germany. The purpose of this paper is to theoretically investigate 
the impact of vertical integration of generation and retail activities on generator 
behaviour in an electricity market.  A two-stage game, based on Crampes and Creti 
(2003), is developed to characterise the short term price setting and strategic capacity 
withholding incentives for vertically integrated generators in an electricity wholesale 
auction.  The purpose is to not only analyse generator incentives for vertically integrated 
firms, but to provide comparisons with incentives for stand-alone generators in an effort 
to better understand the relative merits of the two vertical structures. 
 Consistent with empirical vertical integration literature in electricity markets, the 
model finds that generators’ incentives are determined by their net demand position in 
the market.  Results indicate that for the majority of parameter values, a vertically 
                                                 
3 As has been done by the likes of Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord (2004) 
4 As has been done by Mansur (2003) 
5 This differs from the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) game where firms first simultaneously choose 
installed capacities, and then compete in price competition. 
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integrated structure yields a greater occurrence of competitive pricing in the wholesale 
market.  Furthermore, vertical integration eliminates the incentives for strategic capacity 
withholding for the purpose of increasing the wholesale price.  These findings illustrate 
one short-run aspect in which a vertically integrated structure can provide more 
competitive behaviour by generators in an electricity spot market.     
This paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 outlines the model, Sections 3 and 
4 analyse the pricing and capacity stages of the game, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
 The following duopoly model features independent electricity firms that 
compete in upstream generation and downstream retail.  Generators sell electricity into 
the wholesale (spot) market, from which retailers purchase electricity.  This differs from 
the typical definition of vertical integration in that the integrated firms can’t internalise 
the transaction between the upstream and downstream stages.  Instead, all firms must 
participate in an intermediate market, which is run as an auction. 
2.1 Upstream generation 
Each firm has installed capacity iK , i = 1,2, with constant marginal costs of 
production 0tic  for production up to capacity.  Production above capacity is infinitely 
costly (i.e. impossible).  Costs and installed capacities are common knowledge, as is 
typically the case in electricity markets.  The firms are indexed such that 21 cc d  to 
characterise the feature that each uses a different technology to generate electricity.  
At any point in time, generators aren’t required to declare their entire installed 
capacities as available.  In real world markets this can legitimately be due to 
maintenance, or the expectation that not all output will be dispatched during a particular 
period.  However this model will focus on strategic capacity withholding, where firms 
do so to distort the market price.  If firm i announces capacity [0, ]i iK K , it must be 
prepared to produce up to iK  if and when the market operator calls on it.  Each firm 
incurs no cost in declaring the availability of iK .
6  Generation costs are only incurred 
for output that is dispatched. 
2.2 Downstream retail 
 Both firms also participate in downstream retail, and purchase electricity from 
the wholesale market, into which each generator sell its output.  Each firm i serves a 
fraction iD  of the retail market, where 0 1iDd d  and 1 2 1D D  .  There are constant 
marginal costs in retail, Rc , for all firms, with no vertical economies of scale.  This 
model assumes perfect competition in the retail stage, where each firm charges the same 
retail price, P.  Because this is a short-run analysis, retail shares, iD , and the retail price, 
P, are constant.  The assumption of constant retail shares reflects the fact that this is a 
short-run model, and wholesale prices do not impact consumer switching decisions. 
 Figure 1 is a stylised diagram of the upstream-downstream setting, which bears 
resemblance to that used by Brunekreeft (2002).  However this model incorporates two 
                                                 
6 The impact of this assumption is discussed later in Section 4. 
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generators rather than a monopolist in the upstream stage, as well an intermediate 
market for electricity. 
 
Figure 1: Upstream-downstream setting in the duopoly model 
2.3 Demand 
 Demand is wholesale price inelastic, and equals D .  This reflects the fact that 
consumer decisions are based on retail, not wholesale prices, and the retail price in this 
model is fixed.  The same assumption is made by other theoretical works, including 
Crampes and Creti (2003), and Chisari et al. (2001), as well as empirical papers such as 
Mansur (2003), and Kühn and Machado (2004), who estimate elasticities for Spain in 
2001, with respect to the spot market price to never be more than 0.09. 
 For a given level of demand, capacities can fall into various demand regimes.  
Ex-ante, demand is compared to installed capacities, iK , while ex-post, demand is 
compared to declared capacities iK .  This paper follows the taxonomy of demand 
regimes used by Crampes and Creti (2003) (see Figure 2 below). 
 
- Low demand )( LD   if ),min( 21 KKD d  
- Medium demand )( MD   if ),max(),min( 2121 KKDKK d  
- High demand )( HD   if )(),max( 2121 KKDKK d  
- Excess demand )( ED   if DKK  )( 21  
 
Medium demand consists of two cases: MD1 , where 12 KDK d , and MD2 , 
where 21 KDK d .  In the MD1  regime we say that firm 1 has the capacity advantage, 
while firm 2 holds the capacity advantage in the MD2  regime. 
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Figure 2: Regimes of demand in relation to generation capacities 
2.4 Market rules 
Strategies and Timing 
The two firms play a two-stage game.  First, firms 1 and 2 independently and 
simultaneously announce their available capacities 1 1[0, ]K K  and 2 2[0, ]K K , where 
iK  denotes firm i’s installed capacity.  After observing these capacities, the two firms 
independently and simultaneously choose their bids 1B  and 2B .  Once the bids and 
capacities are submitted, the independent system operator matches supply and demand. 
At the time generators submit ( , )i iB K , demand is known.  
In actual wholesale markets, generators independently and simultaneously 
submit ( , )i iB K , stating the minimum price iB  at which firm i is willing to produce up 
to quantity iK , measured in Mega Watts (MW).  The two-stage setting reflects the fact 
that price bids can quickly change to reflect new information while capacities cannot.  
Due to lack of technological flexibility, firms must plan their capacities prior to 
simultaneously submitting price and quantity bids.  So while firms submit prices and 
capacities at the same time, capacity decisions are made before pricing decisions, as will 
be modelled here.  Additionally, firm i observes the capacity choice of firm j before 
choosing iB , and vice-versa.  This is justified by bidders’ expertise and through 
information provided by market operators.  For example, in the California market, the 
Independent System Operator (ISO) makes publicly available a list of all non-
operational generating units due to planned or unplanned outages.7 
To circumvent the problem of firms biding infinite prices, a whole price cap, ǒ, 
is imposed.  The price cap can be interpreted in a number of ways depending on the 
specific electricity market in question.  Here it will be interpreted it as the regulated 
market cap, as is actually the case in the PJM, California, and Argentine markets.  
Determination of the wholesale price and quantities dispatched 
 The model uses a uniform price, sealed bid auction.  Every generator is paid the 
same unit price, which equals the clearing wholesale price, w, that equates demand and 
                                                 
7 Non-operational units reports for California can be found at http://www.caiso.com/ 
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supply for that particular point in time.  That is, each participant receives the highest 
accepted bid, provided their bid was at or below it.8 
 Let superscript U denote the upstream generation stage, and superscript D 
denote the downstream retail stage.  For a given bid profile B { ),( 21 BB , capacity 
profile K { ),( 21 KK , and demand, D, the quantity dispatched by firm i is given by 
®¯­ ! !
  
)(},0max{
)(},min{
),,(
jijijij
jijijiiU
i ccandBBorBBifKD
ccandBBorBBifKD
Dq BK  (2-1)
If the two firms submit different bids, the lower-bidding firm’s capacity is 
dispatched first, and the higher bidder serves residual demand, if any.  In the event that 
both firms submit the same price, a tie-breaking rule must be made.  This model follows 
Fabra von der Fehr, and Harbord (2004), and assumes the most efficient firm is 
dispatched first.9 
Firm payoffs 
 The payoff each firm receives is its combined upstream and downstream profits.  
Firm i's upstream profit, i = 1, 2, i z j, is: 
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Upstream profit per unit consists of the wholesale price received for units dispatched, 
minus the marginal cost of generation, ic .  The total quantity of electricity provided to 
retail customers, Dq , is the minimum of demand, D, and aggregate declared capacities. 
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Downstream profit per unit equals the retail price P, minus the marginal cost of retail, 
Rc , and the wholesale price.   Firm i's overall profit is the sum of its upstream and 
downstream profits:  
 Di
U
ii D SSS  ),,( BK  (2-5)
We first solve the pricing stage of the game in Section 3, and then go back and solve the 
capacity game in Section 4. 
3. Price competition 
 In this section, the price equilibria for each regime of demand are presented, 
given the capacities declared by each firm.  This is followed by a discussion of the 
results and a comparison with the case of no vertical integration. 
                                                 
8 Uniform auctions are the most commonly used format in reformed electricity markets, and while in New 
Zealand and PJM prices vary from node to node to incorporate transmission constraints, the price at each 
node is determined using a uniform auction.   
9 Sections 3 shows that at no point do the two firms play the same strategy.  Therefore the results for this 
model are robust to the choice of tie-breaking rule. 
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3.1 Price game results 
Theorem 1 In the price game, the equilibrium bids are as follows: 
(i) If 11 DDqK t  and 22 DDqK t , then 
2
*
22
*
1 , cBcB    
The resulting wholesale price is 2c  
(ii) If 11 DDqK t  and 22 DDqK  , then 
0,ˆ *2
*
1   BwB  
The resulting wholesale price is ǒ 
(iii) 11 DDqK   and 22 DDqK t , then 
wBB ˆ,0 *2
*
1    
The resulting wholesale price is ǒ 
Where  21,min),( KKDDqD  K  
The proof requires case by case analysis of each demand scenario, and has been 
relegated to the Appendix.  The price equilibria are expressed graphically in Figure 3 
and the equilibrium profit regions are expressed graphically in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 3: Price game equilibrium bids and prices for vertically integrated firms 
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Figure 4: Price game equilibrium profit regions for vertically integrated firms 
 
 Region 1: )()( 21121 ccPDDcc R  DS  
)( 222 ccPD R  DS  
  
 Region 2: )()( 211121 ccPDKcc R  DS  
   )( 222 ccPD R  DS  
 
 Region 3: )ˆ())(ˆ( 1211 wcPDKDcw R  DS  
   )ˆ()ˆ( 2222 wcPDKcw R  DS  
 
 Region 4: )ˆ()ˆ( 1111 wcPDKcw R  DS  
   )ˆ())(ˆ( 2122 wcPDKDcw R  DS  
 
 Region 5: )ˆ)(()ˆ( 211111 wcPKKKcw R  DS  
   )ˆ)(()ˆ( 212222 wcPKKKcw R  DS  
 
When both firms’ capacities exceed their respective retail shares, wholesale 
pricing at the higher marginal cost of the two firms results.10  When one firm’s retail 
share exceeds its declared capacity, the spot price equals the wholesale price cap, wˆ .  
Essentially, each firm’s bid depends on its retail share relative to its capacity, as well as 
the capacity of it rival.  When a firm’s retail share is less than residual demand if it bids 
high, i.e. when its rival’s capacity is low, it bids high and serves residual demand.  
Conversely, when a firm’s rival has a relatively high declared capacity, the firm is better 
off bidding low to be dispatched first, rather than bidding high and serving residual 
demand, if any.  When both firms’ declared capacities exceed their respective retail 
                                                 
10 Recall, firm 2 is defined as having the higher marginal cost, so the wholesale spot price equals 2c . 
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shares (if they were dispatched first), they both bid low in an effort to be dispatched 
first. 
3.2 Discussion of results 
 Now that the price game equilibria have been presented, the results will be 
discussed in more detail.  The price game yields two price regions: pricing at the higher 
marginal cost, 2c , and pricing at the wholesale price cap, ǒ.  This section analyses the 
variables that determine the size of the competitive pricing region, and discusses the 
results from a welfare and efficiency point of view. 
 The market outcome is most production efficient when electricity is produced at 
least cost, i.e., when firm 1 bids lowest and is dispatched first and firm 2 serves residual 
demand.11  In terms of the price game results, the result is not production efficient in the 
region where    0,ˆ, 21 wBB   (see Figure 3 on page 8) because firm 2 is dispatched 
first.  This region shrinks as firm 1’s retail share 1D  increases.12 In other words, the 
market outcome is more productive efficient when the generator with the lower 
marginal cost has a greater retail share.  A larger retail share constrains firm 1’s 
incentive to price high, resulting in a larger region where it will be dispatched first. 
In the following analysis, it is assumed that welfare increases as the area of the 
competitive pricing region increases.  This isn’t immediately obvious, as consumers 
only see retail, not wholesale prices.  The retail price, P, is taken as exogenous in this 
short run model.  However the wholesale price changes over short periods of time as the 
relationship between demand and capacities changes, and White and Hodgson (2004) 
show that retailers set retail price, P, over the long run as a function of the marginal cost 
of retail and the expected wholesale price, ])[,( wEcfP R , where ]ˆ,0[ ww , and 
])[,( wEcf R  is increasing in E[w].
13  As the area of the competitive pricing region 
increases, E[w] decreases, so P falls. 14  
 It is of interest to note the variables that do not have an impact on the 
competitive pricing area.  Retail factors such as P and Rc , and costs of generation, ic , 
have no influence on the area of competitive pricing.  While the price cap, ǒ, has no 
effect on the competitive pricing region, it determines the price in every other region, 
and an increase in E[w] above marginal cost causes a dead weight loss.  The only 
variables that do determine the size of the competitive region are the firms’ retail shares 
1D , and 2D , and installed capacities 1K , and 2K .   
The area of the competitive pricing region is 
 ))(( 2211 DKDKComp DD   (3-1)
Taking first derivatives with respect to installed capacities yields 
 DK
K
Comp
22
1
D w
w   DK
K
Comp
11
2
D w
w  (3-2)
                                                 
11 Recall firm 1 is defined has having the lower marginal cost of generation. 
12 And likewise, when firm 2’s retail share, 2D , decreases, because  of the restriction that 121  DD . 
13 Here the marginal cost of retail includes the meter lease, line fees and cost to serve. 
14 If the competitive pricing zone increases, the wholesale price equals c2 more frequently (and ǒ less 
frequently), so the expected wholesale price falls.  Section 4 shows that neither firm has an incentive to 
withhold capacity, hence the frequency of marginal cost pricing depends on the size of the competitive 
pricing region. 
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 The competitive area is increasing in installed capacities, providing the other 
firm’s installed capacity exceeds is retail quantity.  The optimal amount of each firm’s 
installed capacity is simply infinity.  This is an uninteresting result, however, as this 
short-run model takes installed capacities as given, ignoring the costs of installation. 
 A more interesting feature is the impact each firm’s retail share has on the size 
of the competitive pricing region.  The optimal retail share for each firm is 
 
D
KK ji
i
 
2
1*D   where , i = 1,2, and i z j (3-3)
 Proof: See Appendix.  In the simplest case where 1K  = 2K , the optimal retail 
shares are *1D  = *2D  = ½.  For 1K  > 2K , the optimal retail shares are *1D  > *2D , with a 
symmetric result for 2K  > 1K .  In essence, the competitive pricing region is largest 
when the larger generator has the greater retail share.  If firm i has the larger installed 
capacity, then MiD  is more likely to occur than 
M
jD , and the competitive pricing region 
in MiD  is increasing in iD .15 
3.3 Comparisons to a non-Vertically Integrated Industry 
 Now that the price game results have been discussed, comparisons with the case 
of no vertical integration can be made.  Figures 5a and 5b are adapted from Crampes 
and Creti (2003), and illustrate the equilibrium bids and prices for the duopoly price 
game without vertically integrated firms. 
 
Figure 5a: Price game equilibrium bids for non-
vertically integrated generators 
Figure 5b: Equilibrium spot 
prices in the price game 
 
For the majority of parameter values, a vertically integrated industry will 
provide a larger area of competitive pricing.  In fact, with symmetric capacities the case 
of vertical integration always performs best.  The proof can be found in the Appendix.  
This illustrates one aspect in which a vertically integrated industry outperforms a non-
vertically integrated market in terms of socially optimal outcomes.  However, only one 
stage of the game has been discussed.  The incentives to withhold capacity will play a 
critical role in determining the frequency with which competitive pricing results.  
                                                 
15 A greater Di automatically means a lower Dj, and the competitive pricing region in MiD  starts at DjD. 
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Crampes and Creti (2003) find strong incentives for strategic capacity withholding in a 
non-vertically integrated industry.  These incentives will now be examined for a 
vertically integrated market. 
4. Capacity competition 
 To provide a point of comparison with the non-vertically integrated case as 
studied by Crampes and Creti (2003), the following capacity game analysis looks at the 
case where demand is known each generator before they declare their capacity.   
4.1 Capacity game results 
Theorem 2 The equilibrium declared capacities ),( *2
*
1 KK  for the capacity game under 
each ex-ante demand scenario are as follows: 
(i) If neither generator is naturally capacity constrained (min( 1K , 2K ) t D), 
then the equilibrium declared capacities ),( *2
*
1 KK  are given by: 
},:),{( 2
*
22
*
11
*
2
*
1 DKKDKKKK Dtttt . 
(ii) If the higher marginal cost generator is naturally capacity constrained where 
DKD 22 Dt! , while the other firm it not constrained, then the equilibrium 
declared capacities ),( *2
*
1 KK  are given by: 
},:),{( 2
*
22
*
11
*
2
*
1 DKKDKKKK Dtttt . 
(iii) If the lower marginal cost generator is naturally capacity constrained where 
DKD 11 Dt! , while the other firm it not constrained, then the equilibrium 
declared capacities ),( *2
*
1 KK  are given by: 
},:),{( 2
*
221
*
1
*
2
*
1 DKKKKKK Dtt . 
(iv) If one generator is naturally capacity constrained where 0t! ii KDD , while 
the other firm it not constrained, then the equilibrium declared capacities 
),( ** ji KK  are given by }),(:),{(
****
iiijjji KKKDKKKK  tt . 
(v) If both generators are naturally capacity constrained where DKD ii Dt! , 
then the equilibrium declared capacities ),( *2
*
1 KK  are given by:  
},:),{( 2
*
221
*
1
*
2
*
1 DKKKKKK Dtt . 
(vi) If both generators are naturally capacity constrained where DKD ii Dt! , 
0t! jj KDD , and DKK ji t )( , then the equilibrium declared capacities 
),( ** ji KK  are given by:  }),(:),{(
****
jjjiiji KKKDKKKK  t! , where 
i, j = 1,2, i  j. 
(vii) If the combined capacities of both generators is such that  DKK  )( 21 , 
then the equilibrium declared capacities ),( *2
*
1 KK  are given by 
},:),{( 2
*
21
*
1
*
2
*
1 KKKKKK   . 
 
The proof of Theorem 2 is achieved by analysing the game on a case-by-case 
basis.  The two firms’ best responses are determined and intersected for each case.  Due 
to the high number of cases involved, the proof has been relegated to the Appendix. 
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4.2 Discussion of Capacity Game Results 
After analysing the equilibria for low, medium, high and excess demand 
regimes, some general conclusions are possible.  If at least one firm is a net retailer with 
respect to installed capacity, then wholesale pricing at the market cap occurs.  If both 
firms have greater installed capacity than their respective retail shares, then competitive 
pricing results.  In every demand scenario, each firm’s best response correspondence 
includes its installed capacity.  This presents a point of departure from Crampes and 
Creti (2003), who find strong incentives to withhold capacities. 
 
Corollary 1  If firms maximise expected profits, then for any density function for 
demand, )(Df  on the support [a, b] where 0ta  and fb , ii KK  * , i = 1,2, is an 
equilibrium for the capacity game. 
 
Proof: For a Nash equilibrium, each firm’s declared capacity is its best response, given 
the other firm’s declared capacity: 
 )|,()|,( *** DKKDKK iiiiii  t SS   DKK ii z ,*  (4-1)
 ³ ³  t dDDfDKKdDDfDKK iiiiii )()|,()()|,( *** SS  (4-2)
 )],([)],([ *** iiiiii KKEKKE  t SS  (4-3)
 This provides a second aspect in which a vertically integrated market can yield 
more socially optimal outcomes.  The pricing game results illustrate that for a broad 
range of parameter values, a vertically integrated industry yields a greater region of 
competitive pricing.  The changes to the price game equilibrium due to vertical 
integration filters through to the capacity game equilibrium.  Firms are now rewarded 
for greater capacity declarations as doing so allows them to avoid a scenario in which 
they are a net retailer and their rival bids the price cap.  The capacity game results show 
that not only does the region of competitive pricing increase, but firms now have no 
incentive to withhold capacities to avoid the competitive region.  Hence, the results 
from the pricing and capacity games illustrate one short-run aspect in which a vertically 
integrated industry yields more competitive outcomes. 
One of the key drivers of these results is the fact that the wholesale market 
operates using a uniform price auction.  Bidding higher than its rival increases the price 
a firm receives for its generating units, but also increases the price it must pay for 
electricity from its competitor.  This trade-off hinges on the retail shares of the two 
firms relative to their capacities and residual demand.  In the pricing game, each firm 
prefers a high price if it anticipates being a net generator, and a low price otherwise.  
The medium demand results, for example, center on whether the firm with the capacity 
advantage will be a net generator or retailer with respect to residual demand.  When it is 
a net generator, the firm bids up to the price cap and serves residual demand.  When it 
would be a net retailer serving residual demand, the firm bids low in an effort to be 
dispatched first. 
 It should be noted that as with Crampes and Creti (2003), this model assumes no 
cost in declaring capacity ],0[ ii KK  .  In reality, declaring a greater capacity involves 
staffing a greater number of units at operational levels, which comes at a cost.  
Introducing a nominal cost of declaring capacity makes each firm declare the lowest 
capacity in each best response, for a given level of its rival’s capacity.  For example in 
the ex-ante low demand capacity game, the equilibrium capacities become 
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),(),( 2
*
2
*
1 DDKK D .  In every case, this will not change the resulting wholesale price.  
Hence, assuming no cost to declare capacity is an appropriate assumption. 
The model also incorporates a single-step supply bid function.  This is the same 
approach as taken by Crampes and Creti (2003), and Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord 
(2004).  Another option is to use a continuously differentiable supply function, as used 
by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Green and Newbery (1992).  The reality, however, 
is that generators submit multi-step supply bids.  In the PJM market, for example, firms 
can submit up to twenty-five pairs of prices and quantities.  Fabra, von der Fehr, and 
Harbord (2004) find that equilibrium outcomes in auctions are independent of the 
number of steps in the offer-price functions, so long as the number of steps is finite.  
Hence, a single-step supply function is also an appropriate assumption.
5. Conclusions 
This paper provides insights into the impact vertical integration of generation 
and retail activities has on pricing and capacity declarations in a wholesale electricity 
auction.  Drawing from Crampes and Creti (2003), a two-stage duopoly model is 
developed where vertically integrated generators first simultaneously declare capacities, 
and then simultaneously submit prices into a uniform-price auction.  Pricing and 
strategic capacity withholding behaviour in a wholesale market for vertically integrated 
generators is characterised and compared to the case of no vertical integration. 
The primary findings are as follows.  First, vertical integration, under most 
circumstances, will increase the region of competitive pricing in the price game.  This 
result draws from the downstream benefit each firm receives for a lower wholesale 
price.  Due to the fact that both firms cannot be net retailers or suppliers at the same 
time, vertical integration eliminates the mixed-strategy equilibria found by Crampes and 
Creti (2003), as well as Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord (2004), for a non-vertically 
integrated industry.   
In terms of capacities, vertical integration provides no incentives for strategic 
capacity withholding.  Having a greater capacity in the pricing game provides firms 
with a greater ability to set wholesale prices, and reduces the possibility of them being a 
net retailer in a scenario where the rival firms bids the wholesale price cap.   
 This paper provides contributions on a number of fronts.  First, it provides the 
first tractable model with which to understand the short-run implications of vertical 
integration on capacity withholding and wholesale auction bidding.  The model is 
consistent with Crampes and Creti (2003), to facilitate comparisons with the case where 
generators do not participate in retail.  
Another contribution comes from the policy implications that result.  While a 
number of countries have undergone reform, the majority do not consider the 
transformation to be complete, and are still considering where to take reforms from 
here.  For example, since 1998 the England and Wales market has begun to permit a 
limited degree of vertical integration (Green, 2004), while New Zealand, after its 2001 
supply troubles, has considered mandating vertical separation (Hodgson, 2002).  Also, a 
large number of electricity industries, particularly in Africa have yet to undergo reform.  
The results here illustrate one upside of a vertically integrated electricity industry for 
policy makers considering which market structure to impose.  
Despite its upsides, a vertically integrated electricity structure does limit 
downstream competition in retail.  As New Zealand has found, stand-alone retailers find 
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it harder to compete as it is more difficult to purchase hedges from rival firms who are 
naturally hedged (Hodgson, 2002).  For this reason vertical integration can act as a 
barrier to entry in retail.  This model has explicitly assumed a competitive retail sector, 
but it is feasible for non-competitive behaviour in retail to occur as a result of a lack of 
participants.  Hence, while this paper provides useful insights into generation behaviour 
as a result of vertical integration, it does not cover the entire picture, and should be used 
as one of a number of tools in policy making. 
 Current discussion of capacity withholding in electricity markets, as well the 
optimality of permitting vertical integration provide numerous areas for further study.  
A natural extension to this paper is to model a vertically integrated industry where the 
two generating firms do not serve the entire retail market between them.  This could be 
used to explain the empirical claim by Kühn and Machado (2004) that the entry of 
stand-alone retailers will result in greater wholesale prices, as integrated firms shift 
towards being net generators. 
Another area to analyse is the impact of a change in the auction format.  While 
the overwhelming majority of electricity markets use uniform-price bid auctions, papers 
by Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord (2004), among others, have begun to analyse 
pricing behaviour in discriminatory auctions where each generator receives the price it 
bids, rather than the system marginal price.  Despite the fact that discriminatory 
auctions in electricity are rare, the growing quantity of research suggests that it is under 
consideration in some markets, and the UK electricity regulator recently made the 
switch to it (Green, 2004).  An extension of this vertically integrated model to the case 
of a discriminatory auction would provide useful insights into the relative performance 
of the two auction formats for a vertically integrated industry.
Like Crampes and Creti (2003), Kühn and Machado (2004), Klemperer and 
Meyer (1989), and Green and Newbery (1992), this paper uses a duopoly, rather than an 
n firm oligopoly.  Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord (2004) find that pricing at marginal 
cost is more likely in a more fragmented (non-vertically integrated) industry.  The fact 
that results are not robust to the number of firms in the industry is important, as many 
industries operate with more than two participants.  Using an oligopoly would make for 
a useful extension to this model. 
Auction formats vary across markets in terms of the timing of bids.  In New 
Zealand, generators can edit their bids up to two hours prior to dispatch, while in the 
PJM market, participants offer their supply curves on a day-ahead basis.  The earlier 
generating firms have to submit their supply functions, the greater the uncertainty of 
demand at the time prices and capacities are set.  In terms of modelling, price offers are 
made before the realisation of demand is known.  Fabra, von der Fehr, and Harbord 
(2004) find that demand uncertainty upsets all candidate pure-strategy equilibria in 
auctions, resulting in only equilibria in mixed strategies.  They find, for the case of no 
vertical integration, that a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium exists in which generators 
submit bids that strictly exceed marginal cost.  Hence, the results here do not apply to a 
market in which demand is uncertain at the time bids are submitted.  Incorporating this 
feature into the model would make for useful research if a market with this specific trait 
is in question.   
 One other practical extension would be the analysis of a Stackelberg16  game in 
capacities where firms do not submit capacities simultaneously, but rather one at a time, 
                                                 
16 Tirole (1988), chapter 8, provides a good discussion of von Stackelberg’s 1934 paper. 
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allowing one firm to view the capacity of its rival before declaring its own.  
Furthermore, discussion by Green (2004) highlights the fact that modelling firms which 
own more than one generating plant, each with different capacities and marginal costs, 
would provide insights into firms’ incentives to bid higher on their highest cost plant 
with the intention of raising the system marginal price and making greater profits on 
their lower bidding plants. 
 Empirical work is also possible for vertically integrated electricity markets.  A 
structural approach, much like the one used by Kühn and Machado (2004) for Spain, 
could be used to compare bidding behaviour for net suppliers and net demanders in a 
wholesale market.  Comparisons of pricing behaviour over time for different levels of 
participation of stand-alone retailers would also make for useful research.  New 
Zealand, for example has experienced a steady increase in the aggregate retail share of 
vertically integrated firms. 
 While the issue of vertical integration in electricity markets continues to cause a 
divergence in approaches taken by reforming markets, this paper at least clarifies the 
impact vertical integration has on short-run incentives by generators in wholesale 
electricity auctions.  Participation in the retail market by generators constrains their 
incentives to price high in the wholesale market, resulting in a larger area of competitive 
pricing.  Furthermore, vertical integration provides no incentives for firms to 
strategically withhold capacity, resulting in competitive pricing whenever feasible.  
Vertically integrating does produce problems, however, as it can act as a barrier to entry 
in retail, resulting in weaker retail competition.  This paper provides useful insights into 
behaviour as a result of vertical integration, but does not cover the entire picture, and 
should be used as one of a number of tools in policy making. 
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 
 The following proof analyses the price game through a case-by-case analysis of 
each demand regime. 
Case 1: Low Demand Regime 
 The low demand regime, LD , occurs when DKK t),min( 21 .  Each firm has 
sufficient capacity to serve demand on its own.  If firm i bids higher than its rival it will 
only serve the retail market, earning profit )( iRi
High
i BcPD  DS .  If the firm 
undercuts its rival, the firm earns )()( iRiii
Low
i BcPDDcB  DS .  So long as Bi 
> ci, the firm prefers being the lowest bidder given its rival’s bid, i.e. LowiS  > HighiS .  
However, firms 1 and 2 are not symmetric.  With its lower marginal cost of generation, 
firm 1 can undercut firm 2 (or in this model, bid B1 = c2, due to the tie-breaking rule), 
and always serve the wholesale market itself.  Firm 1 will only just bid low enough to 
undercut its rival because its profit Low1S  is increasing in B1 for 11 D .  The resulting 
equilibrium bids and profits for the low demand regime are described below. 
 
 2
*
22
*
1 , cBcB    (A-1)
 )(,)()( 22221121 ccPDccPDDcc RR   DSDS  (A-2)
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Case 2: Medium demand regime MD1
 The medium demand regime occurs when ),max(),min( 2121 KKDKK d , and 
consists of two cases, one where firm 1 has the capacity advantage, and the other where 
firm 2 has the advantage.   
In MD1 , firm 1 can either undercut firm 2’s price and serve wholesale demand 
itself, or it can charge above firm 2 and serve residual demand.  Its decision depends on 
firm 2’s bid, 2B .  Firm 1 bids high if its profit for doing so (
High
1S ) exceeds its profit 
from undercutting firm 2 and serving demand on its own ( Low1S ).17 
 Low1S   High1S  
 )ˆ())(ˆ()()( 1212112 wcPDKDcwBcPDDcB RR d DD  (A-3)
Solving for 2B  gives 
 M
D
cwKwB 2
2
12*
2
)ˆ(ˆ JD  
d  (A-4)
Thus for ],0[ 22
MB J , firm 1 will bid high.  With no vertical integration, Crampes and 
Creti (2003) find that firm 2 bids just low enough to make firm 1 want to play high, so 
long as the bid required to do so is greater or equal to its marginal cost.  The 
introduction of vertical integration changes this however, as it is now possible for firm 2 
to credibly bid below marginal cost.  Consider firm 2’s profit if it undercuts firm 1 by 
bidding H 12 BB , and has its capacity dispatched: 
 )()( 222222 BcPDKcB R  DS  (A-5)
Taking the first partial derivative with respect to firm 2’s bid gives DK
B 222
2 DS  w
w . 
Firm 2’s profit is increasing in its bid if DK 22 D! , and decreasing in its bid if 
DK 22 D .  Hence, if firm 2’s declared capacity is less than its retail share, it bids down 
to 0 in an attempt to undercut firm 1.  If DK 22 Dt , firm 2 bids down to 2c  in an 
attempt to undercut its rival.  Figure 6 graphs firm 2’s minimum credible bid and M2J – 
the critical value that firm 2 must bid below to make firm 1 bid high. 
 
Figure 6: Firm 2’s minimum bids and M2J in the MD1  regime 
                                                 
17 Firm 1 will choose to bid above firm 2 if its profit is increasing in the wholesale price when it serves 
residual demand.  For this reason, it will bid the price cap, ǒ, when bidding high. 
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 For DK 22 Dt , firm 2 is unable to make firm 1 play high, and competitive 
pricing results.  When DK 22 D , firm 2 bids 0 while firm 1 bids the price cap, ǒ, and 
serves residual demand.18  The resulting equilibrium bids and profits in the medium 
demand regime where firm 1 has the capacity advantage )( 21 KDK !t  are described 
below. 
(i) If DK 22 D , the equilibrium bids of the MD1  regime are 
 0,ˆ *2
*
1   BwB  (A-6)
 )ˆ())(ˆ( 1211 wcPDKDcw R  DS  
 )ˆ()ˆ( 2222 wcPDKcw R  DS  
(A-7)
(ii)       If DK 22 Dt , the equilibrium bids of the MD1  regime are 
 2
*
22
*
1 , cBcB    (A-8)
 )()( 21121 ccPDDcc R  DS  
 )( 222 ccPD R  DS  
(A-9)
 Case 3: Medium demand regime MD2  
 In the MD2  regime, firm 1 attempts to bid such that firm 2 chooses to bid high 
and serve residual demand.  It bids 1B , so that 
 Low2S   High2S  
 )ˆ())(ˆ()()( 2121221 wcPDKDcwBcPDDcB RR d DD  (A-10)
Solving for 1B  gives 
M
D
cwKwB 1
2
21*
1
)ˆ(ˆ JD  
d  (A-11)
Hence, for ],0[ 11
MB J , firm 2 will bid high.  Much like its rival in the MD2  regime, 
firm 1’s profit is increasing in its bid if DK 11 D! , and decreasing in its bid if 
DK 11 D .  So firm 1’s minimum credible bid is 0 if DK 11 D , and 1c  if DK 11 Dt .  
However, firm 2’s minimum credible bid is 2c , because DK 22 D!  throughout the MD2  
region.  Therefore, firm 1 will bid 2c  for DK 11 Dt , because its profit is increasing in 
1B  (less than 2B ) and it can still undercut its rival.  Figure 7 graphs 
M
1J  and firm 1’s 
minimum credible bid, for values of 1K . 
                                                 
18 This result can be verified algebraically 
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Figure 7: Firm 1’s minimum bids and M1J in the MD2  regime 
 
 The result is symmetric to the MD1  regime.  For DK 11 Dt , firm 1 cannot bid 
low enough to make firm 2 high, and competitive pricing results.  When DK 11 D , 
firm 1’s profit is decreasing in the wholesale price, so it bids 01  B  while firm 2 bids 
up to the price cap, ǒ, and serves residual demand.  The resulting equilibrium bids and 
profits in the medium demand regime where firm 2 has the capacity advantage 
)( 12 KDK !t  are as follows: 
(i) If DK 11 D , the equilibrium bids of the MD2  regime are 
 wBB ˆ,0 *2
*
1    (A-12)
 )ˆ()ˆ( 1111 wcPDKcw R  DS  
 )ˆ()()ˆ( 2122 wcPDKDcw R  DS  
(A-13)
(ii) If DK 11 Dt , the equilibrium bids of the MD2  regime are 
 2
*
22
*
1 , cBcB    (A-14)
 )()( 211121 ccPDKcc R  DS  
 )( 222 ccPD R  DS  
(A-15)
Case 4: High demand regime 
The high demand regime, HD  is defined where )(),max( 2121 KKDKK d .  
Neither firm can serve the wholesale market on its own, but together, the two firms have 
sufficient capacity to meet demand.  In this regime, each firm is guaranteed to have 
some capacity dispatched, regardless of what it bids (up to the price cap, ǒ). 
 Recall, each firm can credibly bid down to zero if DK ii D .  Due to the 
definition of the high demand, the case where both firms are net retailers with respect to 
declared capacity is impossible.  Therefore, at most, only one firm will be willing to bid 
down to zero for any given area of HD .  Consider the case where DK 22 Dt , i.e., 
where firm 2 never bids below marginal cost.  Firm 1 prefers pricing at 2c  to serving 
residual demand if its profit for bidding low exceeds its profit for bidding high. 
Low
1S  > High1S  
 )ˆ())(ˆ()()( 12121112 wcPDKDcwccPDKcc RR ! DD  (A-16)
Solving for 1K  gives 
 21
 1
12
2112
1 )(
)ˆ()ˆ)(( ID  
!
cc
cwDcwKDK  (A-17)
Figure 8a compares the region in HD  where DK 22 Dt  to the line 1I  graphically: 
 
Figure 8a: I1 in the high demand region 
where K2  D2D 
Figure 8b: I2 in the high demand region 
where DK 22 D  
  
1K  t 1I  throughout the region in question,  therefore firm 1 always bids low this area.  
Furthermore, when DK 11 D , firm 1’s profit is decreasing in the wholesale price, so it 
bids down to zero, as opposed to 2c . 
 In the case where DK 22 D , firm 2 can now bid down to 0.  This means the 
critical line 1I  no longer applies.  Firm 1 will now attempt to undercut firm 2 if its profit 
for bidding zero exceeds its profit for serving residual demand.19 
Zero
1S  > High1S  
 )ˆ())(ˆ()0()0( 121111 wcPDKDcwcPDKc RR ! DD  (A-18)
Solving for 1K  gives 
 2
1
211
1
))(ˆ(ˆ ID  
c
KDcwwDK  (A-19)
This new condition is expressed graphically in Figure 8b.  All values of 1K  in 
the region in question lie above the critical line, so firm 1 never bids low when 
DK 11 Dt  and DK 22 D .  And because its price is increasing in its own bid, firm 1 
will bid the price cap, ǒ. 
 It now remains to determine firm 2’s bids for each region of the HD  regime.  
Consider the case where DK 11 Dt , i.e., where firm 1 will not bid below marginal cost.  
Firm 2 prefers pricing at marginal cost to serving residual demand if its profit for 
bidding low exceeds its profit for bidding high, Low2S  > High2S . 
 )())(()( 2212222 BcPDKDcBccPD RR ! DD  (A-20)
Solving for 1K  gives DK 11 Dt .  Therefore, firm 2 will always bid low in this 
region.  Furthermore, when DK 22 D , firm 2 will bid 02  B . 
                                                 
19 Note that K1  D1D in this region, meaning its profit is increasing in the wholesale price.  Therefore, if 
firm 1 bids above firm 2, it will choose to bid up to the wholesale cap, ǒ. 
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Now consider DK 11 D , where firm 1 can credibly bid down to zero.  Firm 2 
prefers pricing at zero to serving residual demand if Zero2S  > High2S . 
 )ˆ())(ˆ()0()0( 212222 wcPDKDcwcPDKc RR ! DD  (A-21)
Rearranging gives )()(ˆ0 21211 DKKcKDw ! D , which is impossible,20 hence 
firm 2 will bid the price cap, ǒ, and serve residual demand when DK 11 D .  The 
resulting equilibrium bids and profits in the high demand regime are as follows 
(i) If DK 11 Dt  and DK 22 Dt , the price equilibria of the HD  regime are 
 2
*
22
*
1 , cBcB    (A-22)
 )()( 211121 ccPDKcc R  DS  
 )( 222 ccPD R  DS  
(A-23)
(ii) If DK 11 D  and DK 22 Dt , the price equilibria of the HD  regime are 
 wBB ˆ,0 *2
*
1    (A-24)
 )ˆ()ˆ( 1111 wcPDKcw R  DS  
 )ˆ())(ˆ( 2122 wcPDKDcw R  DS  
(A-25)
(iii) If DK 11 Dt  and DK 22 D , the price equilibria of the HD  regime are 
 0,ˆ *2
*
1   BwB  (A-26)
 )ˆ())(ˆ( 1211 wcPDKDcw R  DS  
 )ˆ()ˆ( 2222 wcPDKcw R  DS  
(A-27)
Case 5: Excess demand regime
The excess demand regime, ED , is defined where DKK  )( 21 .  The 
combined capacities of both firms falls short of demand, resulting in a power shortage.  
Regardless of what each firm bids up to the price cap, it will have its entire capacity 
dispatched.  Each firm i serves )( 21 KKi D , rather than DiD  in the retail market.  
Whether each firm prices high or low depends on its relative capacity iK  to its retail 
share )( 21 KKi D .  Firm i’s profit is given by 
 )),max()(()),(max( 212121 BBcPKKKcBB Riiii  DS  (A-28)
Firm i’s profit is increasing in ),max( 21 BB  if )( 21 KKK ii ! D , i.e., when it is a 
net generator, and decreasing in ),max( 21 BB  if )( 21 KKK ii d D .  Therefore, firm i 
will bid wBi ˆ  when )( 21 KKK ii ! D , and 0 iB  otherwise.  Because both firms 
serve the entire wholesale and retail markets between them, if one firm is a net 
generator, the other is automatically a net retailer.  If follows that at any point in time in 
the excess demand regime, one firm bids the market cap, ǒ, and the other bids 0.  The 
resulting wholesale price is always ǒ.  The resulting equilibrium bids and profits in the 
excess demand regime are as follows 
(i) If )( 2111 KKK ! D , the equilibrium bids of the ED  regime are 
 0,ˆ *2
*
1   BwB  (A-29)
 )ˆ)(()ˆ( 211111 wcPKKKcw R  DS  (A-30)
                                                 
20 Recall, only the area where K1 < D1D is under question, and the high demand regime is defined by (K1 
+ K2) t D. 
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 )ˆ)(()ˆ( 212222 wcPKKKcw R  DS  
(ii) If )( 2111 KKK d D , the equilibrium bids of the ED  regime are 
 wBB ˆ,0 *2
*
1    (A-31)
 )ˆ)(()ˆ( 211111 wcPKKKcw R  DS  
 )ˆ)(()ˆ( 212222 wcPKKKcw R  DS  
(A-32)
Proof of Section 3.3 
Let 
2
1
ˆ
ˆ
cw
cw

 ]  represent firm 1’s cost advantage over firm 2.  Crampes and Creti 
(2003) find that in the high demand regime, for )(
1 21
KDK d ]
] , two pure strategy 
equilibria exist, where one firm bids low and the other bids high, as well as an 
equilibrium in mixed-strategies over a continuous support.  They go on to use the 
mixed-strategy equilibrium in the capacity choice game, seemingly to make life easer 
for themselves in that expected profits for the mixed-strategy are simply 
 ))(ˆ( iii KDcwE  S  (A-33)
 Thus, when analysing the capacity game, Crampes and Creti (2003) don’t 
contend with the fact that firm profits depend on who happens to be playing low.  
However, Fabra von der Fehr and Harbord (2004) argue that only the two pure strategy 
equilibria should be considered because they each Pareto dominate the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium in payoffs.  It is for this reason that the pure strategy equilibria will be used 
here, where the wholesale price in this region is always ǒ.  The size of the competitive 
pricing area for the non-vertically integrated industry is 
   ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
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

1
2
21 ˆ
ˆ
cw
cwDKDK  (A-34)
The size of the competitive pricing area for vertically integrated firms is 
   DKDK 2211 DD   (A-35)
A vertically integrated structure will yield a larger competitive pricing region if 
(A-35) > (A-34).  Both competitive pricing regions include the low demand zone.  
Subtracting this zone from each side and simplifying gives (A-36), where the left hand 
side represents the competitive pricing region for a vertically integrated industry, and 
the right hand side represents the competitive pricing region for the non-vertically 
integrated industry.21  So the expression holds if the vertically integrated industry has a 
larger area of competitive pricing. 
         ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§

!
1
12
112221 ˆ
11
cw
ccDKDKDK DDD  (A-36)
Let ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§

 
1
12
ˆ cw
ccG represent the cost disadvantage of firm 2 relative to the price cap.  
Recall 121  DD , therefore the above expression can be expressed using only one 
firm’s retail share. 
        DKDKDK ! 122221 1 GDDD  (A-37)
                                                 
21 See Figures 3 and 5 for confirmation. 
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 The maximum value the right hand side (non-integrated case) can take occurs 
when į = 1,22 while the minimum value for the left hand side occurs when either 02  D  
or 12  D , depending on the relative capacities of the two firms.  If 02  D , the best the 
non-vertically integrated case can do is match vertical integration in terms of the 
competitive pricing region.   In fact, the only way a vertically integrated industry can 
yield an inferior outcome is if 2D  is close to zero, ǒ is close to 2c , and most 
importantly, 21 KK ! .  For the majority of parameter values, (A-35) > (A-34), meaning 
the vertically integrated market will yield a larger area of competitive pricing.  
Proof of Theorem 2 
The proof of Theorem 2 is achieved by analysing the capacity game on a case-by-case 
basis.  The two firms’ best responses are determined and intersected for each case.  
Readers should consult Figure 4 on page 9 when following this proof. 
Case 1: Low Demand 
 First, consider the case where D  min( 1K , 2K ).  Each firm has sufficient 
installed capacity to serve entire demand.  We start with the best responses of firm 1. 
Firm 1’s best response if firm 2 declares 2K t K2 t D
 If firm 1 declares 1K  t K1 t D, it will be in profit region 1, earning 
)()( 21121 ccPDDcc R  DS .  If firm 1 declares D > K1 t D1D , it will be in 
profit region 2, earning )()( 211121 ccPDKcc R  DS .  Finally, if firm 1 declares 
D1D  > K1 t 0, it will be in profit region 4, earning )ˆ()ˆ( 1111 wcPDKcw R  DS .  
In comparing profits, firm 1 always prefers declaring a capacity that exceeds demand to 
declaring D > K1 t D1D , because its profits are increasing in K1 in region 2.  Firm 1 
prefers region 1 to region 4 if 
 1Re1
gionS  > 4Re1 gionS  
 )ˆ()ˆ()()( 1112112 wcPDKcwccPDDcc RR ! DD  (A-38)
Firm 1’s profit if it declares D1D  > K1 t 0 is increasing in K1, so assume it declares K1 
= D1D  – H.  Rearranging (8-15) gives 
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
! HD  (A-39)
This will always hold, so if firm 2 declares 2K  t K2 t D, firm 1’s best response is to 
declare 1K  t K1 t D. 
Firm 1’s best response if firm 2 declares D > K2 t D2D
 If firm 1 declares 1K  t K1 t D, it will be in profit region 1.  If it declares D > K1 
t D1D , firm 1 will be in profit region 2.  For D1D  > K1 t (D – K2), firm 1 will be in 
profit region 4.  Finally, for 0)( 12 t! KKD , firm 1 will be in profit region 5, 
earning )ˆ)(()ˆ( 211111 wcPKKKcw R  DS .  Firm 1’s profit in region 5 is 
increasing in K1, so it prefers region 4.  Comparing the three remaining regions follows 
                                                 
22 I.e., where 2ˆ cw  . The case where the price cap is less than the marginal cost of the least efficient 
firm is ignored because that firm would choose not to participate in generation. 
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exactly from the previous case.  Hence, if firm 2 declares D > K2 t D2D , firm 1’s best 
response is to declare 1K  t K1 t D. 
Firm 1’s best response if firm 2 declares D2D > K2 t 0 
 If firm 1 declares 1K  t K1 t (D – K2), it will be in profit region 3, earning 
)ˆ())(ˆ( 1211 wcPDKDcw R  DS .  If firm 1 declares (D – K2) > K1 t 0, it will 
be in profit region 5.  In comparing the two possible outcomes, firm 1 prefers to bid 
above D – K2 if 
 3Re1
gionS  > 5Re1 gionS  
)ˆ)(()ˆ()ˆ())(ˆ( 21111121 wcPKKKcwwcPDKDcw RR ! DD  (A-40)
Rearranging gives 0))ˆ(ˆ)(( 1121 ! wcPcwKKD RD .  Assuming firm 1 makes 
positive per unit profits when the wholesale price equals ǒ, it prefers to declare above 
(D – K2) if )( 21 KDK  . This is always the case for region 5, so if firm 2 declares 
D2D  > K2 t 0, firm 1’s best response is to declare 1K  > K1 t (D – K2). 
To summarise, the best response correspondence for firm 1 is: 
 ®¯­ t!
tt 
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It now remains to determine the best response correspondence for firm 2. 
Firm 2’s best response if firm 1 declares 1K t K1 t D 
 If firm 2 declares 2K  t K2 t D2D , it will be in profit region 1, earning 
)( 222 ccPD R  DS .  For D2D  > K2 t 0, firm 2 will be in profit region 3, earning 
)ˆ()ˆ( 2222 wcPDKcw R  DS .  In comparing firm 2’s profits, it prefers 
competitive pricing if 
1Re
2
gionS  > 3Re2 gionS  
 )ˆ()ˆ()( 22222 wcPDKcwccPD RR ! DD  (A-41)
Rearranging gives 22 KD !D .  This is always the case in region 3, therefore if firm 1  
declares 1K  t K1 t D, firm 2’s best response is to declare 2K  t K2 t D2D . 
Firm 2’s best response if firm 1 declares D > K1 t D1D 
 If firm 2 declares 2K  t K2 t D2D , it will be in profit region 2 earning 
)( 222 ccPD R  DS .  For D2D  > K2 t (D – K1), firm 2 will be in profit region 3.  
Finally, for (D – K1) > K2 t 0, firm 2 will be in profit region 5, earning 
)ˆ)(()ˆ( 212222 wcPKKKcw R  DS . 
 Much like firm 1, firm 2’s profits are increasing in its own capacity in region 5, 
so firm 2 prefers region 3 to region 5.  Comparing firm 2’s profits in region 2 to region 
3 provides the same result as the previous case so firm 2 prefers region 2.23  Hence, if 
firm 1 declares D > K1 t D1D , firm 2’s best response is to declare 2K  t K2 t D2D . 
Firm 2’s best response if firm 1 declares D1D > K1 t 0 
 If firm 2 declares 2K  t K2 t D2D , it will be in region 4 earning 
)ˆ())(ˆ( 2122 wcPDKDcw R  DS .  For (D – K1) > K2 t 0, firm 2 will be in 
region 5.  Comparing firm 2’s profits in each region provides the same result as the 
                                                 
23 Note firm 2’s profits are identical in regions 1 and 2. 
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symmetric case for firm 1.  If firm 1 declares D1D  > K1 t 0, firm 2’s best response is to 
declare 2K  t K2 t (D – K1).  To summarise, the best response correspondence for firm 
2 is: 
 ®¯­ t!
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The capacity game equilibria is obtained by intersecting each firm’s best response 
correspondence. 
Case 2: Medium Demand 
The cases where iK  t D > jK  t DjD  will be discussed first, followed by the 
cases where iK  t D > DjD  > jK  t 0.   
Firm 1 has the capacity advantage 
The case where 1K  t D > 2K  t D2D  reduces the number of options firm 2 has 
in declaring capacity, and eliminates the MD2  regime.  All best responses discussed 
previously are applicable here, only there are now less cases to analyse. 
If firm 2 declares D > K2 t D2D , firm 1’s best response is to declare 1K  t K1 t 
D, and if firm 2 declares D2D  > K2 t 0, firm 1’s best response is to declare 1K  > K1 t 
(D – K2).  The best response correspondence for firm 1 is 
 ®¯­ t!
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 Firm 2’s best responses are as follows, keeping in mind K2 t D is no longer an 
option.  If firm 1 declares 1K  t K1 t D, firm 2’s best response is to declare 2K  t K2 t 
D2D .  If firm 1 declares D > K1 t D1D , firm 2’s best response is to declare 2K  t K2 t 
D2D .  Finally, if firm 1 declares D1D  > K1 t 0 firm 2’s best response is to declare 2K  
t K2 t (D – K1).  Firm 2’s best response correspondence is   
®¯­ t!
tt 
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The capacity game equilibria is obtained by intersecting each firm’s best response 
correspondence. 
Firm 2 has the capacity advantage 
For 2K  t K2 t D, firm 1 prefers to declare 1K  > K1 t D1D , and be in profit 
region 2, than declare D1D  > K1 t 0, and be in profit region 4 if 
 2Re1
gionS  > 4Re1 gionS  
 )ˆ()ˆ()()( 11121112 wcPDKcwccPDKcc RR ! DD  (A-42)
 Firm 1’s profit in region 2 is increasing in K1, so assume K1 = 1K  for that area.  
Firm 1’s profit in the high pricing region is also increasing in K1, so assume K1 = D1D .  
Comparing the profits gives DK 11 D! .  This is defined as true for the case under study, 
so if firm 2 declares 2K  t K2 t D, firm 1’s best response is to declare K1 = 1K . 
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If firm 2 declares D > K2 t D2D , the analysis for the previous case comes in to 
play again, and firm 1’s best response is to declare K1 = 1K .   Finally, if firm 2 declares 
D2D  > K2 t 0, firm 1’s best response is to bid 1K  > K1 t (D – K2).  To summarise, the 
best response correspondence for firm 1 is: 
 ®¯­ t!
tt  
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 Firm 2’s best response will now be determined.  If firm 1 declares D > K1 t 
D1D , firm 2’s best response is to declare 2K  t K2 t D2D , and for D1D  > K1 t 0 its 
best response is to declare 2K  t K2 t (D – K1).  The best response correspondence for 
firm 2 is: 
 ®¯­ t!
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The capacity game equilibria is obtained by intersecting each firm’s best response 
correspondence. 
The firm without the capacity advantage has a greater retail share than its 
installed capacity 
When 1K  t D > D2D  > 2K  t 0, the result is a further reduction of firm 2’s 
capacity options.  Firm 1’s best response is to declare 1K  > K1 t (D – K2).  Firm 2’s 
best response if 1K  > K1 t (D – K2), is to declare its actual capacity, because its profits 
in the area, )ˆ()ˆ( 2222 wcPDKcw R  DS , are strictly increasing in K2.  The 
capacity game equilibria is obtained by intersecting each firm’s best response 
correspondence.  The symmetric equilibrium is obtained for 2K  t D > D1D  > 1K  t 0. 
Case 3: High demand 
 The case where ),max()( 2121 KKDKK t!  will now be solved.  For 2K t K2 
t D2D , firm 1’s best response is 1K .  For D2D  > K2 t 0, firm 1’s best response is iK t 
K1 t (D – K2).  Firm 1’s best response correspondence is 
 ®¯­ t!
tt!  
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 For 1K t K1 t D1D , firm 2’s best response is K2 t D2D .  For D1D  > K1 t 0, 
firm 2’s best response is 2K t K2 t (D – K1).  Firm 2’s best response correspondence is 
 ®¯­ t!
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The capacity game equilibria is obtained by intersecting each firm’s best response 
correspondence. 
The other high demand capacity game equilibria are as follows.  In the cases 
where DKD ii Dt!  and 0t! jj KDD , and both firms have sufficient combined 
capacity to meet demand, the high pricing region of HD  results, where firm j bids 
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0 jB  and firm i bids the price cap to serve residual demand.  Firm i’s best move is 
)( jii KDKK tt , and firm j’s best move is jj KK  . 
Case 4: Excess demand 
For the case where )( 21 KKD t  each firm’s profit can be expressed as 
)))(,max(()),(max( jijiRiiijii KKBBcPKcBB  DS .  Assuming (max(Bi,Bj) 
> ci) and (P – cR > max(Bi,Bj)),  for i=1,2, each firm’s profit is strictly increasing in its 
own capacity.  The resulting equilibrium consists of one point where 
2
*
21
*
1 , KKKK   .   
Proof of Section 3.2 
Finding the optimal values *1D  and *2D , given demand and installed capacities, 
requires a simple constrained optimisation problem. 
Maximise ))(( 2211 DKDK DD   subject to 121  DD  
Lagrangian: )1())(( 212211 DDODD  DKDKL  (A-43)
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Substitute the expressions for 1D  and 2D  into the constraint and solve 
 
D
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2
1*
1D   (A-44)
One can easily verify that the second order sufficient conditions hold for a maximum. 
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